Truces are often decoys, none more so than the shaky ones that occasionally occur in Pakistan between the government and the militants who busy themselves trying to undermine its institutions. Two years ago, when General Pervez Musharraf was still in power, he reached what seemed to be a workable understanding with the Taliban and other militants in the North Waziristan tribal district near Afghanistan. But this agreement, though it was praised by some as necessary to curtail violence in the region, was actually providing cover for an influx of Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists from neighboring Afghanistan into Waziristan's new safe haven. Meanwhile, the Taliban and al-Qaeda trained more terrorists in Pakistan, and as subsequent events unfolded, it became even more apparent that the militants were not interested in reconciliation with the government.

A major flashpoint was Bajaur, just north of Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where U.S. intelligence pinpointed a school that was being used as a training ground for insurgents. The Pakistani military fired missiles at the site and killed 82 people. And while there was general agreement that the Bajaur site was a terrorist base, the consequences of the Pakistanis firing on their own people were enormous. Soon, many more Pakistanis were calling for war against the U.S. and Musharraf's regime became even more unpopular. Islamic militants then staged a series of violent terrorist attacks against the military. Asked to describe the decision to fire on the Bajaur school, one official noted, "We were caught between the devil and the deep sea." On July 15th, 2007, the Taliban in Waziristan renounced the truce and was again in an all-out war with Pakistan.

The encroachment of terrorists into Pakistan has taken one drastic turn after another. In lieu of the frightening string of terrorist attacks occurring in the FATA recently, the government has lost what civilian presence it once wielded there, with the military left standing alone to prevent these border regions' secession from Pakistan proper. Indeed, the balancing act that the government must play - between helping the United States fight the terrorists and appeasing the Taliban so that they don't challenge the country's sovereignty - is one of extreme proportions, with no easy solution. Due to the breaking of the Waziristan truce from 2007 and the resulting upswing in violence, North Waziristan is now firmly a Taliban sanctuary. According to the "Pakistan Assessment 2008," a study published by the Southeast Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), "Well over half the territory presently under Pakistan's control...has passed outside the realm of civil governance and is currently dominated essentially through military force." What's more, the terrorists currently controlling the tribal areas in Pakistan have achieved complete freedom of movement, attacking Western interests in Afghanistan or military interests in Pakistan as they please. A United Nations report from September 2007 indicates that more than 80 percent of suicide bombers in Afghanistan are recruited and trained in Pakistan.

Naturally, the U.S. has been immensely interested in defeating the terrorists in Pakistan, especially since the new government under Asif Ali Zardari seems rather powerless to deal decisively with the insurgency. President Bush, who aggressively pursued an alliance with Musharraf and his illegitimate regime, has had to play a delicate game with the Pakistanis. For while Pakistan's government has been officially opposed to the incursion of the Taliban, the U.S. has on numerous occasions accused Pakistani intelligence of simultaneously cultivating ties with the Taliban and protecting the whereabouts of certain Taliban leaders.

Such accusations are definitely grounded in truth, and they have made the Americans look for more direct ways to infiltrate Pakistan and take out terrorist targets. For the U.S., Pakistan must quash its terrorist insurgency in order to solidify its democratic roots. In order to remain secret about their operations toward these ends and avoid incurring the wrath of the Pakistanis, U.S. officials have made their own counterterrorist intrusions as silent as possible. Until the summer of 2007, the Bush Administration made extensive use of Predator unmanned drones to attack live targets, with unofficial approval by the Pakistani authorities. As Steve Coll of The New Yorker writes, "In public, the Pakistani government often denies its involvement, because the attacks are unpopular; in private, it approves them, in the hope that it will keep the United States off its back and perhaps throw the Taliban off balance." However, the Administration clearly determined that the Predator attacks have not been sufficient, for it changed its policy to use the Special Forces to attack terrorist targets within Pakistan if it has sufficient intelligence.

With the U.S. election so close, it's worth taking a look at how the Presidential candidates stand on Pakistan policy. Barack Obama's stance mirrors that of President Bush: Obama would favor launching direct military strikes on Pakistan - without the cooperation of the Pakistanis - to take out prominent Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. Obama's aggressive stance has already angered some Pakistanis: the Pakistani Policy Blog, which traces Pakistanis' reactions to the candidates' statements in the press, says that most Pakistanis "abhor this policy." If Obama becomes President, his policy could alienate the Pakistani military, perhaps even turning it against Zardari's civilian government in a devastating battle of wills.

Another aspect of Obama's Pakistan policy is his support of the proposed bill by Biden and Richard Lugar that would channel U.S. aid into the economic and civil sectors of Pakistan. This bill has met some resistance from Bush, so Obama can claim that he is departing from old Bush policies. But as several commentators have noted, the bill would hardly change the balance of power in the tribal areas, will not come into effect for at least a year, and offers no interim plan for economic aid.

John McCain's criticism of Obama's policy has focused on the supposed irrationality of his plan to go after high-value targets in Pakistan. On September 26th, McCain said, "You don't say that [launching military strikes on Pakistan] out loud. If you have to do things, you have to do things, and you work with the Pakistani government." McCain is not in disagreement with launching such strikes, but he clearly realizes that announcing them is a folly that only worsens the violation of sovereignty that such a cross-border attack would entail. Like Bush and Obama, McCain might take military action, but unlike his predecessor and opponent, it would come with a realization that cultivating ties with the Pakistani military is of prime importance. To his credit, McCain has emphasized that resolving the conflict in Waziristan and other areas involves getting the people (and the military) to cooperate with U.S. objectives and start turning against the Taliban and other terrorist groups on their own.

Yet while Obama and McCain exchange remarkably similar ideas on Pakistan, both need to realize that the situation there has been changing drastically. By the end of September, Obama had become more hawkish than Bush on Pakistan: the Administration decided to suspend Special Forces raids temporarily in order to gauge the Zardari government's reaction to previous attacks. That doesn't mean that Bush will disavow further covert incursions between now and the end of his term, but it does mean that Obama should consider the implications of violating a country's sovereignty and the potential for anti-American and anti-democratic backlash following military attacks. McCain's policy toward Pakistan's military, while sound, would have to be augmented by a willingness to reach out to the failing Pakistani economy and build up democratic institutions.

The American public is fortunate to have a choice between two candidates who believe in a realist approach to foreign policy. Pakistan, because of its immense complexity, is a true barometer of how America will conduct its relations with the rest of the world. Because both candidates seem to recognize that the stakes are high enough in Pakistan to warrant direct U.S. intervention, the true difference between them will be in how well they can adapt their own preconceptions to the evolving conditions on the ground. Indeed, whoever is elected in November will inevitably realize that President Bush's experience with Pakistan, though rocky at times, can be used to shape successful future policy if it's not confined to the dustbin of the past.