Those of us who grew up watching news footage out of Bosnia and the Persian Gulf are used to the idea of U.S. air supremacy. It’s hard to imagine that our fleet of multibillion-dollar death machines and the smooth-talking übermenschen who flew them actually had a legitimate challenger for command of the skies as recently as the Reagan Administration.

In the early 1980s, the Soviets delivered the Pentagon a double whammy with the introduction of the Su-27 ‘Flanker’ and the MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ air superiority fighters. Intelligence out of Russia indicated that these sleek, maneuverable birds would comfortably outperform their NATO counterpart, the F-15 Eagle, in air-to-air combat. 

Above, from left: Su-27 'Flanker,' MiG-29 'Fulcrum.'

The Raptor only entered service in 2005, long after the arms race party had ended. But redundancy aside, the new plane was without a doubt the most impressive fighter ever put into production. Built from lightweight composites and armed with stealth and supercruise capability (meaning it is capable of supersonic flight without the aid of afterburners), the F-22 is said to be able to engage between six and eight rival jets at once. Experts across the board have been quick to acknowledge its “overwhelming lethality.”

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, however, the Air Force has been steadily scaling back its requirement for new Raptor jets, and is now set to receive just 187 of them in total. And three days ago, under pressure from the Obama Administration, the Senate voted 58-40 to remove another purchase provision from the latest military spending bill, effectively ending production of the fighter indefinitely.

The rationale is straightforward. The F-22, although impressive, is thoroughly designed for air superiority; that is, its primary role is to clear the skies of comparable threats. If the skies over the Middle East were teeming with high-tech enemy fighter aircraft, then it would make sense to continue production. But despite being fully operational now, no F-22 Raptor has yet seen combat. At $350 million apiece, it is hard to justify maintaining a large force of them.

The Pentagon instead is banking on the cheaper F-35 Lightning II, a somewhat less capable (but still outstandingly advanced) aircraft to fill the gap. As a carrier-launched fighter-bomber, the Lightning II is more limited as a fighter plane but more versatile, especially given the demands of asymmetric warfare. The F-35 will enter service in 2016.

Above, from left: F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II

Shutting down the F-22 program has been hailed as a victory for the Obama Administration, which is eager to re-adapt the military for the unconventional threats of the 21^st century. Certainly it makes sense to steer the military away from a weapon that is strategically obsolete. The F-22 was a relic of the Cold War, right?

Not quite. The United States isn’t the only country that has had trouble getting over the arms race. As soon as we began cooking up the Raptor in the 80’s, the Russians began work on their own next-gen fighter to counter the F-22.

The project ran out of steam when the Soviet Union collapsed, but in 2002, the Russian government resurrected it. In 2002, they contracted Sukhoi (the maker of the Su-27) to develop the PAK FA, post-Soviet Russia’s new air superiority fighter. The jet will make its debut flight this year and is expected to enter service in 2013.

The PAK FA’s specifications are hazy, but it will supposedly boast many of the same features as the Raptor, including stealth technology, supersonic cruising speed, and superb maneuverability. Sukhoi has had trouble getting the funding it needs to develop the plane, but given the experience of the Cold War it would be a mistake to underestimate the Russians’ ability to cobble together quality weaponry at a low price.

In fact, Sukhoi’s economical approach to the PAK FA may be what makes it most dangerous. Unlike the Raptor, Russia intends to develop the new jet for export. In mass production for global consumption, the PAK FA could easily become the world’s cheapest stealth aircraft.

China, too, has began development of its first stealth fighter in 2002. Although it is unlikely the the Shenyang J-XX will be able to compete technically with a Western or Russian counterpart, its arrival would nonetheless further complicate the Pentagon’s long-term plans for air supremacy. The People’s Revolutionary Army Navy’s stated desire to build or acquire an aircraft carrier in the coming years presents yet another challenge to American superiority in the Pacific.

The Administration’s aim of repositioning the U.S. military to meet tomorrow’s threats is an admirable one. But American politicians have a poor record of forecasting future threats. In the 1990s, the U.S. military reached the pinnacle of conventional warfighting capabilities, just in time for a wave of unconventional wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Now, ten years too late, we’re finally readjusting our forces what we imagine to be a future rife with asymmetric conflict.

But while we’ve been adventuring British Empire-style in the developing world, our conventional rivals have been quietly amassing the economic resources necessary to challenge our military dominance. Russia is richer than ever and desperate to reassert its claim as a superpower. China’s legendary rise will enable the country finally to build a blue water navy and a first-rate air force, and to project its power further into the Pacific than it has been able to do for centuries.

The relatively tension-free years we've enjoyed since end of the Cold War have been an exception to a long-standing historical rule. It would be naive to assume they'll last forever. Sooner or later the Pax Americana will endand the United States will again have to contend with a political, economic, and/or military equal on the world stage. Whether or not violent conflict is the result, the leverage of military might will remain indispensible.

The question is, will the United States have the foresight to anticipate these new challenges? Or will we transform our forces into the ultimate counterinsurgency machine, cutting out “relics” like the F-22, capital ships, and heavy armor, just in time for our next confrontation with a rival superpower? Reconfiguring our forces for the next Afghanistan and saving money while doing it is both strategically intuitive and politically astute. That’s exactly why it might be the wrong thing to do.