The story of how some young Muslim immigrants to Europe become radicalized seems well-known.  Growing up in tight-knit Muslim communities in Europe's major cities, they initially yearn to explore beyond the mosque and experience that mix of hedonism and intellectual study that defines the Western world. But at some point, or so the narrative goes, they are discriminated against by the native Europeans. Nothing, it seems, can be done to make them truly “British” or “French” or whatever nationality they hope to attain. After reflecting inwardly, a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran becomes the shield, and membership in a terrorist organization becomes the sword of their new perverted religion.

And while many commentators have polarized this debate by either blaming European intransigence or blaming Islam for the radical segments of Europe’s Muslim population, the reality seems to combine both views. Islamic radicalization in Western Europe may not be due to an inherently violent tendency within fundamentalist Islam, but rather because those Muslims disaffected with the materialist and secular society around them, like those Germans and Italians who joined the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigade in the 1970s under the banner of “socialism,” are simply grafting their own selfish worldviews onto pre-established doctrinal teaching of which they probably have little knowledge. Nonetheless, the doctrine that such rebels choose to give lip service to, be it Marxism-Leninism or pan-Islamism, is usually vague enough to be distorted.

In order to reduce the attractiveness of terrorism to disaffected Muslim youth, non-violent Islamic fundamentalists can be cultivated as vigorous opponents to Islamic radicalism. This plan is not new; acccording to Lorenzo Vidino in the Washington Quarterly, the counterterrorism policies of several European countries, from Britain to the Netherlands to Germany, are based around the central tenet that “…engaging nonviolent Islamists for security purposes without empowering them seems the best strategy.”  However, this policy is unfeasible in the long-term unless Western European governments also recognize that their own adamantly secular traditions have marginalized all religion, not just Islam, and its role in society. Indeed, Europe’s modern problem with Islam can be traced directly to the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on rationality and secularism. In France, where the intellectual energy of the Enlightenment fueled a nationalist revolution in 1789, the Catholic Church lost its former predominance, and secularism became the new religion. Arguably since from that point onward, religion across Europe – in Western Europe, at least – has become so far separated from government that open religious expression is frowned upon.  A senior researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris commented to the International Herald Tribune (here, bottom of page) that in France “Any religious assertiveness is seen as a threat.”

The process of Islamic radicalization may never be stopped completely in Europe. But it can be severely constrained if European governments start looking at fundamentalism as a critique of modern democracy, perhaps by also looking for reforms that can unite Christian and Jewish groups with like-minded Islamic groups who are concerned about the moral fabric of their countries. Cooperation among Christian, Jewish, and Islamic fundamentalist groups, as Malise Ruthven notes in the New York Review of Books, can “…bring the more conservative and isolated strands of Islam into the cultural mainstream.”  Radical Islamist thought can thereby be diluted, socializing would-be terrorists by making them aware of the heightened risks of breaking away from the Muslim community.

Yet others would argue that what constitutes European democracy on the one hand and what constitutes a strict interpretation of the Koran on the other hand are concepts that are difficult, perhaps impossible, to reconcile. As Georgy Lederer notes in an article on Islamic radicalism in Eastern Europe, “Europe’s abdication before Islamism in pursuit of short-sighted benefits involves entry into treacherous terrain.” He cautions European leaders that “It was not détente that brought down the Soviet Union.” While his comments make sense, one must wonder to what extent European leaders are willing to sanctify the seminal events of 1789 at the exclusion of religion. These leaders would do well to acknowledge the equally powerful Judeo-Christian tradition that predates that of secularism, and that Islam owes its existence to an amalgamation of Jewish and Christian teachings. Promoting cooperation among clerics of different faiths that share common social goals ought to become an integral part of counter-radicalization programs in Europe. More attention should be given to the fact that supposedly non-religious ideologies, such as secular democracy and socialism, are just as susceptible to radical distortions of reality as are the world’s major religions. So while vigorous counterterrorism policies in Europe are certainly necessary to stop what is a very dangerous threat from Islamic radicals, an expansive counter-radicalization strategy that recognizes the shortcomings of both rigid secularism and rigid Islamism, and that also addresses the discrepancy between freedom of religious expression in Europe and many European governments’ reluctance to acknowledge the actual importance of religion, is a long-term approach worthy of Europe’s rich cultural tradition.