As American and South Korean intelligence agencies scrambled to confirm the culprit behind the attack on the South Korean warship Cheonan in March, Japanese officials grappled with the political consequences of allowing a US air base to remain on Okinawa. At first glance it seems that American power in the Pacific is being tested by both allies and potential foes, and that these tests signal our faltering influence overseas. But lest we succumb to unwise kneejerk reactions, we should remember that we remain the foremost power in Asia and our weaknesses lie in overreaction.

A quick snapshot of the region reveals that we are the preeminent power in East Asia. Inhabitants of the Pacific Rim consume American foods, hunger for American fashions and trends, and watch America’s every move in every sector, public and private. Militarily speaking, the United States commands the largest sustainably deployable blue water navy of any East Asian power, tens of thousands of troops in South Korea and Japan, and a formidable nuclear arsenal. But our power in the region isn’t merely thanks to our cultural pull or our military might, or even our economic strength—our dominance is thanks in no small part to the myriad divides between the various East Asian powers. As evidence, I submit Exhibit A: the East Asian Co-Animosity Sphere.

If the name of my exhibit echoes with a certain morbid familiarity in your head, it’s because it’s based on the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, an old Imperial Japanese euphemism for “Brutal Empire of Japan.” Japanese conduct during the Second World War managed to infuriate both China and Korea, two other regional powers. This wouldn’t have been such a problem had these countries not tapped into their massive economic potential and risen from the ashes of war to become two of the most economically and militarily powerful countries in Asia. Oops.

But one-sided hatred of Japan does not do justice to the East Asian Co-Animosity Sphere. It is after all, a Co-Animosity Sphere, and there’s plenty of ill will to go around. Japan fears China, while both China and South Korea dislike and fear a militarizing Japan. South Korea isn’t exactly on historically friendly terms with a China that once forced vassal status on the Korean nation, and China doesn’t look favorably on a volatile North Korea. North Korea hates South Korea, while both Koreas hate Japan. More important than the hate-fest is the fact that all nations in the Co-Animosity Sphere fear each other, and fissures unique to the East Asian political sphere prevent these nations from uniting under an anti-American banner.

So what stops this hate-fest from erupting into an all out war? The answer is an American presence. American troops in South Korea deter North Korean aggression, while our troops in Japan assure South Korea, China, and Japan that no Japanese military buildup is necessary or forthcoming. The cost of these assurances is that American policy becomes a popular lightning rod. China confronts our naval forces regularly, while Japan and South Korea agitate for a reduced American presence.  These are signs that these nations find it politically valuable to target US policy—a precursor to the formation of an anti-US alliance.

Given that we are the most preeminent power in East Asia whether by virtue of our own greatness or East Asian infighting, it stands to reason that extreme moves are impractical and do much to hurt our standing. For example, an aggressive American response to North Korean provocation would worry China (North Korea’s only friend) and South Korea (North Korea’s primary military target). On the other hand, pulling troops out of Okinawa would worry Japan and South Korea, both of whom would feel exposed to regional threats. The worst thing we could do is put an end to the East Asian Co-Animosity Sphere and replace it with either a Yankee-hating alliance (via heavy-handed American policy) or a bloody Sino-Korean-Japanese war (via American retreat from the region). It is in our national interest to keep these East Asian nations on their toes but never with their fingers on the trigger—a delicate balance indeed.